Prompt Recapitalization Act by Unnava, Vaasavi
The Journal of Financial Crises 
Volume 3 Issue 3 
2021 
Prompt Recapitalization Act 
Vaasavi Unnava 
Yale Program on Financial Stability 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises 
 Part of the Economic History Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Finance and Financial 
Management Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, and the Public Policy 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Unnava, Vaasavi (2021) "Prompt Recapitalization Act," The Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 3 : Iss. 3, 
254-284. 
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol3/iss3/15 
This Case Study is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and 




Prompt Recapitalization Act1,2 
Vaasavi Unnava3 
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 
November 12, 2021 
Abstract 
In 1997, Japan’s banks were in crisis due to hundreds of billions of dollars of non-
performing real estate loans. In response, the government performed three rounds of 
capital injections in 1998, 1999, and the early 2000s. The capital injection of 1999, 
authorized by the Prompt Recapitalization Act, made as much as ¥25 trillion ($208 billion) 
available to financial institutions that applied, regardless of their capitalization. By the end 
of the injection window, 32 banks and trusts applied for and received ¥8.6 trillion ($71.6 
billion) total in preferred shares and subordinated debts. The Act required banks to submit 
and adhere to restructuring plans in order to receive capital, leading to a series of mergers 
and acquisitions. However, differing accounting methodologies, evergreening, and double 
gearing allowed for systemic undercapitalization even with injections intended to help 
institutions meet reserve requirements.  
Keywords: capital injection, double gearing, evergreening, Financial Reconstruction 
Commission, Japan, Japanese Financial Crisis, jusen, non-performing loans, Resolution and 
Collection Corporation, zombie lending 
 
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to broad-based capital injection 
programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 
2 The Prompt Recapitalization Act is also referred to in Japanese financial crisis literature and government 
documents as the Banking Recapitalization Act, Early Strengthening Act, and Financial Function Early 
Strengthening Act, written as 金融早期健全化法 in Japanese. 





At a Glance  
In 1997, the Japanese financial crisis 
began with the ballooning of non-
performing loans in the financial system. 
After a capital injection in spring 1998 
believed to be ineffective and under-
allocated, the Japanese Diet passed the 
Prompt Recapitalization Act on October 
13th, 1998.  
The Act allocated ¥25 trillion ($208 
billion) of capital to be injected into any 
bank and some non-bank financial 
institutions that applied. The Financial 
Reconstruction Commission (FRC) 
reviewed each application. The 
applications required that applicants 
submit management improvement plans 
in addition to information on capital 
requests. These management 
improvement plans factored into the 
FRC’s prescribed underwriting terms for 
the capital injection—taking place in the 
form of preferred shares and 
subordinated debt—purchased by the 
Resolution and Collection Corporation 
(RCC), a subsidiary of the Depository 
Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ). 
The DICJ funded RCC’s purchasing through a series of government-backed agency bond 
issuances, with leeway to borrow from the Bank of Japan as needed. There was no explicitly 
defined repurchase schedule. 
Between March 1999 and March 2002, 32 banks applied for capital injections; no 
applications were rejected. Overall, of the ¥25 trillion allocated, ¥8.6 trillion ($71.6 billion) 
was used to purchase preferred shares and subordinated bonds. Applicant banks, trusts, 
and regional banks received varying capital underwriting terms dependent on the 
submission of management improvement plans. By mid-2015, all banks but one had 
repurchased all shares and subordinated debt.  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: restore both domestic and foreign confidence 
in Japan’s financial system by disposing of non-
performing loans on the balance sheets of financial 
institutions. 
Announcement Date August 5, 1998 
Operational Date October 16, 1998 
Injection Start Date March 31, 1999 
End of Application Window March 31, 2001 
Program Size ¥25 trillion ($208 billion) 
Peak Utilization ¥8.6 trillion ($71.6 
billion) 
Eligibility Any financial institution; 
some nonbank financial 
institutions 
Participants 32 financial institutions 
Administrator Resolution and Collection 
Corporation of Japan 
Legal Authority Passed through the 
Japanese Diet; executed 
by the Prime Minister’s 
Office and DICJ  
Prompt Recapitalization Act 
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Experts view the 1999 capital injection as more successful than that of 1998. However, 
there are differing views on whether the system remained undercapitalized following the 
injection. While some scholars argue the system was fully capitalized, others note the 
systemic underreporting of non-performing loans on balance sheets, propagated by 
governmental intervention as well as the practices of zombie lending (extending capital to 
non-performing firms to disguise non-performing loans) and double gearing (cyclical asset 
purchasing to increase capital on balance sheets) prevented full capitalization of the 








Japan Context 1998–1997 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$4.35 trillion in 1997 
$4.52 trillion in 1998 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$35,022 in 1997 
$31,903 in 1998 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt) 









Size of banking system 
$9.86 trillion in 1997 
$9.73 trillion in 1998 
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP 
226.5% in 1997 
215.1% in 1998 
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial 
system 
84.1% in 1997 
79.2% in 1998 
5-bank concentration of banking system 
42.6% in 1997 
43.6% in 1998 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
Data not available for 
1997–1998 
Government ownership of banking system 
Data not available for 
1997–1998 
Existence of deposit insurance 
Yes in 1997 
Yes in 1998 
Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World 
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset. 
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The Japanese financial crisis began in November 1997, after the default of a midsized 
securities firm, Sanyo Securities, leading to Japan’s first interbank loan default. Within 
weeks, Hokkaido Tokushoku, a major bank in Japan, was forced to declare bankruptcy due 
to inability to borrow in the interbank market, followed by the securities dealer Yamaichi 
Securities. Within the month, Tokuyo City Bank also failed. By December 1997, the 
government determined a necessity for public intervention in the financial market, but 
simultaneously permitted a change in accounting methodology where banks’ real estate 
assets regularly listed on balance sheets as historical acquisition prices rather than book 
value, allowing banks to artificially inflate the value of the loans on their balance sheets 
(Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). The decision led to an eventual loss of confidence in the 
accounting and auditing system in Japan, as the true amount of bad loans at failed financial 
institutions exceeded the amount published prior to the failure of these institutions (Fukao 
2000).  
While the Japanese financial system faced difficulties in the early 1990s, there was no 
formalized capital injection framework, as Japan had never suffered a banking crisis in the 
post-war era (Nakaso 2001). The Japanese Diet, the legislative body of Japan, passed its 
first measure of intervention to counteract the banking crisis in February 1998 with the 
Financial Function Stabilization Act. The act allocated ¥30 trillion of public funds to 
support the banking sector, of which ¥13 trillion was specifically allocated for bank 
recapitalization (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). 
Experts viewed the capital injection of March 1998 as unsuccessful, with only ¥1.8 trillion 
utilized out of the ¥13 trillion allocated, spread across 21 institutions (Hoshi and Kashyap 
2010). Banks were reluctant to participate in the program, unwilling to be singled out as a 
weaker bank. Ultimately, all major banks applied for capital injections simultaneously to 
disguise any signaling of weakness (Nakaso 2001). The healthiest bank of the 21 
institutions applied for only ¥100 billion in capital with only one bank applying for more. 
As a result, few if any banks received enough funding to become well-capitalized (Hoshi 
and Kashyap 2010). In addition, there was no thorough clean-up of bank balance sheets for 
those banks seeking public capital injections (Fukao 2000). Banks originally shunned the 
program, but government pressure finally resulted in each of the major banks applying for 
the same amount of public funds. There were two possible reasons for banks refusing 
public funds. First, banks may have feared applying for public funds in sending negative 
signals about their respective balance sheets pushing down the value of existing equity. 
Banks may also have feared the seniority of new securities purchased by the government to 
existing security claims (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010).  
Public dissatisfaction over the handling of the financial crisis mounted, leading to a show of 
public distrust in the current Diet with the election of the Liberal Democratic Party to 
majorities in both houses of the Diet as well as the Prime Ministership (Hoshi and Kashyap 
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2010). In summer 1998, issues in the financial system proved persistent with the stock 
price of Long-Term Credit Bank falling sharply after a rejected merger between itself and 
Sumitomo Trust and Banking (Fukao 2000).  
Many major Japanese banks still were under-capitalized following the execution of the 
Financial Function Stabilization Act. In response, the plenary session of the Japanese Diet 
began with the Liberal Democratic Party announcing a forthcoming package of bills aimed 
to combat the unstable Japanese financial landscape. The Prime Minister’s Office on August 
5, 1998, introduced a package of five financial stabilization bills to the Diet (Japan Times 
1998a). On October 16, 1998, the Japanese Diet passed the Prompt Recapitalization Act, the 
final form of the bank recapitalization bill (Japan Times 1998e). A timeline of legislation 
passed during 1998 is in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Timeline of Legislation 
February 16, 1998 Financial Function Strengthening Act 
June 5, 1998 Financial Reconstruction Law 
Mid-Early October 1998 Establishment of FRC 
Revolving Credit Transfers Facilitation Act 
Financial Services Agency Establishment Act  
Amendment to Deposit Insurance Act 
Measures regarding debt management collection 
business 
Mid-Late October 1998 Prompt Recapitalization Act 
December 1998 FRC Inaugurated  
 
Source: Nakaso 2001. 
Program Description 
The Prompt Recapitalization Act was intended to restore both domestic and foreign 
confidence in Japan’s financial system by disposing of non-performing loans on the balance 
sheets of financial institutions (Prompt Recapitalization Act 1998). The Act also increased 
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the budget for capital injections into undercapitalized banks from ¥13 trillion under the 
previous law to ¥25 trillion ($208 billion) (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). 4 
The recapitalization was overseen by the Financial Reconstruction Commission, created by 
the Financial Reconstruction Commission Establishment Law to oversee operations under 
the suite of new laws passed for financial stabilization in October 1998 (Nakaso 2001; 
Prompt Recapitalization Act 1998). The FRC was an independent commission and arm to 
the Prime Minister’s office called the Financial Reconstruction Commission (FRC). The FRC 
was independent of the Bank of Japan or the Treasury. Five members were appointed to 
this committee, with the chairman appointed from the prime minister’s cabinet (Nakaso 
2001). The FRC was required to terminate its job of special administration on March 31, 
2001 (Iimura 1999).   
The Financial Revitalization Act5, a sister act passed in the same month as the Prompt 
Recapitalization Act, established the Resolution and Collection Committee (RCC)6, an asset 
management corporation, as a subsidiary of the Depository Insurance Corporation of Japan 
(DICJ) (DICJ 2021b). Funded by the DICJ, the RCC purchased either preferred stocks or 
subordinated bonds from the financial institutions that applied for capital injections under 
the new scheme (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010; DICJ n.d.a).  
No banks were excluded from eligibility under the Prompt Recapitalization Act. Three non-
bank financial institutions, all cooperatives, were also eligible, referred to by name in the 
law: Norinchukin Bank; the Agricultural Cooperative Association; and the Federation of 
Fisheries Cooperative Associations. There were also no barriers to foreign banks 
participating, although these foreign banks were subject to more stringent capital adequacy 
requirements in comparison to their domestic counterparts (Prompt Recapitalization Act 
1998). Each organization faced separate capital adequacy ratio definitions dependent on 
their status as bank holding companies, financial institutions, or financial institutions with 
subsidiaries as well as their status as domestic or foreign institutions.  
In addition to no exclusions from eligibility for this intervention, there were no explicit 
capital limits written for participating banks.  
 
 
4 In addition to the ¥25 trillion allocated for recapitalization, the government allocated an additional ¥18 
trillion for the nationalization of failed banks under the Financial Revitalization Act (Fukao 2000, 4). 
Combined with ¥17 trillion in depositor protection, this totaled to a ¥60 trillion package for financial 
stabilization (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010, 409). 
5 The Financial Revitalization Act is also referred to as the Act for Rehabilitation for Financial Functions. It 
was Act No. 132 during Heisei 10, or 1998, written as 金融機能の再生のための緊急措置に関する法律 in 
Japanese. 
6 For more information regarding the RCC and its operations, please refer to the “The Resolution and 
Collection Corporation of Japan” authored by Mallory Dreyer (2021). 
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Banks requesting capital funding applied through the newly formed FRC and had to 
provide restructuring plans to demonstrate how they planned to improve performance. 
These plans were made available to the public (Nakaso 2001). In addition to restructuring 
personnel, banks were asked to reduce the number of foreign branches (Fukao 2000). 
Banks with higher capital adequacy ratios that sought funding were required to absorb 
failing banks through mergers and acquisitions (Japan Times 1998d).  
These additional constraints partially determined the terms for preferred shares 
purchased by the RCC through capital injection. After receiving the request for a capital 
injection, the FRC would assess the performance of the bank, nature of the instrument for 
injection, and the management improvement plan to determine the appropriate cost of 
capital for each bank (Nakaso 2001). After these terms were decided by the FRC, the RCC 
would purchase and ultimately manage the shares and subordinated debt using capital 
from the DICJ Early Strengthening Account, a fund set up for injections under the Prompt 
Recapitalization Act, also called Act for the Early Strengthening of Financial Functions (DICJ 
2021b; n.d.a).  
Outcomes 
In the initial phase of capital injections, 15 of the 16 major banks in Japan participated, 
requesting a total of ¥4.8 to ¥5.7 trillion (Naito 1999). After evaluation, the 15 banks were 
rewarded more capital than requested, totaling ¥7.46 trillion based on assessed need 
(Fukao 2000; Nakaso 2001).7 Over the next two years, an additional 17 institutions applied 
for capital injections, bringing the total to ¥8.6 trillion: ¥7.32 trillion in preferred shares 
and ¥1.32 trillion in subordinated bonds (DICJ n.d.a). The FRC did not turn down any 
applications (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). This injection exceeded the capital injection of 
1998, for which 21 institutions applied for a total of just ¥1.8 trillion. 
Almost every bank repurchased their shares and debt sold to the DICJ under this program, 
as shown in Figures 1 and 2 below. Shinsei Bank remains the exception; formerly the Long-
Term Credit Bank nationalized under the Financial Reconstruction Act, Shinsei Bank 
continues to list the Resolution and Collection Commission as a major shareholder. As of 
March 31, 2020, the DICJ and RCC hold 18.1% of Shinsei bank’s common shares (Shinsei 




7 For more information on the terms of lending and private capital fundraising information, please refer to 
Tables 1 and 2 in (Fukao 2000). 
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Figure 2: Timeline of preferred share repurchasing 
Bank Injection Date Final Repurchase Date 
* Shinsei Bank is the successor of the nationalized Long-Term Credit Bank, nationalized 
Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank March 1999 July 2006 
Fuji Bank March 1999 July 2006 
Industrial Bank of Japan March 1999 August 2005 
Sakura Bank March 1999 October 2006 
Sumitomo Bank March 1999 September 2006 
Sanwa Bank March 1999 May 2006 
Tokai Bank March 1999 June 2006 
Toyo Trust & Banking March 1999 June 2006 
Mitsubishi Trust & Banking March 1999 January 2001 
Daiwa Bank March 1999 March 2009 
Asahi Bank March 1999 June 2015 
Sumitomo Trust & Banking March 1999 March 2013 
Chuo Trust & Banking March 1999 March 2013 
Bank of Yokohama March 1999 August 2004 
Ashikaga Bank September & November 1999 February 2006 
Hokuriku Bank September 1999 July 2009 
Hokkaido Bank March 2000 August 2009 
Bank of the Ryukyus September 1999 July 2010 
Hiroshima-Sogo Bank September 1999 December 2005 
Kumamoto Family Bank February 2000 May 2006 
Shinsei Bank* March 2000 — 
Chiba Kogyo Bank September 2000 July 2013 
Yachiyo Bank September 2000 March 2006 
The Nippon Credit Bank October 2000 June 2015 
Kansai Sawayaka Bank March 2001 October 2003 
Higashi-Nippon Bank March 2001 March 2011 
Kinki Osaka Bank April 2001 June 2015 
Gifu Bank April 2001 December 2010 
Fukuoka City Bank January 2002 July 2010 
Wakayama Bank January 2002 December 2005 
Kyushu Bank March 2002 February 2008 
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under the Financial Reconstruction Act. 
Source: Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan 2020b. 
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Figure 3: Timeline of subordinated debt repurchasing. 
Bank Injection Date Final Repurchase Date 
Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank March 1999 March 2005 
Fuji Bank March 1999 September 2004 
Industrial Bank of Japan March 1999 March 2004 
Sanwa Bank March 1999 September 2005 
Asahi Bank March 1999 March 2009 
Sumitomo Trust & Banking March 1999 January 2004 
Mitsui Trust & Banking March 1999 March 2005 
Bank of Yokohama March 1999 May 2004 
Kansai Sawayaka Bank March 2001 January 2004 
Source: Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan 2020b. 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Prompt Recapitalization Act was introduced in conjunction with other 
financial revitalization legislation, though not explicitly part of a package.  
The Japanese Diet passed a series of financial revitalization bills on October 2, 1998 (Japan 
Times 1998c). Among these bills were the Financial Reconstruction Committee 
Establishment Law, the Revolving Credit Transfers Facilitation Act, the Financial Services 
Agency Establishment Act, an amendment to the Deposit Insurance Act, and measures 
regarding debt management collection businesses. The evening of the passage of this set of 
bills, the Liberal Democratic Party proposed a plan for bank recapitalization to be debated 
by the upper and lower houses of the Japanese diet (Japan Times 1998b). The bill was 
passed 14 days later on October 16, 1998 (Japan Times 1998e).  
The legislation was part of a series of capital injections between 1998-2008, preceded by a 
capital injection in March 1998, and followed by a third injection legislation in June 2004 
(Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). 
2. The Prompt Recapitalization Act passed formally through the Japanese Diet. 
The Japanese Diet first addressed the banking crisis in February 1998 with the Financial 
Function Stabilization Act. This act allocated ¥30 trillion of public funds for a set of 
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measures, including ¥13 trillion for bank recapitalization (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). 
However, just ¥1.8 trillion of funds were allocated in March 1998 (DICJ 2020a).  
The plenary session of the 1998-99 Japanese Diet began with the Liberal Democratic Party 
announcing a forthcoming package of bills aimed at the unstable Japanese financial 
landscape. Beginning as two financial stabilization bills introduced to the Diet by the Prime 
Minister’s Office on August 5, 1998, the proposed stabilization program eventually evolved 
into the Financial Reconstruction Act—which provided the framework with which to 
nationalize the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan—in addition to an act establishing the 
Financial Reconstruction Commission, both of which were passed through the lower house 
on October 2, 1998 (Iimura 1999; Japan Times 1998a; Japan Times 1998b). That evening, 
the Liberal Democratic Party proposed a bill for bank recapitalization (Iimura 1999). On 
October 13, 1998, the Japanese Diet passed the Prompt Recapitalization Act, the final form 
of the bank recapitalization bill (Japan Times 1998d).  
Through the new bills, the government doubled available funds for financial revitalization 
from ¥30 trillion to ¥60 trillion. Of this ¥60 trillion, ¥25 trillion was available for capital 
injections (Nakaso 2001). These injections were done in installments as banks applied for 
funding (DICJ 2021a). In addition, ¥18 trillion was allocated to nationalize failed banks and 
¥17 trillion was allocated for depositor protection (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). 
3. The capital injection was overseen by the FRC, an independent commission 
under the Prime Minister’s office, but the RCC, an asset management company, 
purchased and managed preferred shares and subordinated debts.  
Within two months of the passage of the Prompt Recapitalization Act, the Financial 
Reconstruction Commission (FRC) began to work on determining the dividend policies for 
the preferred shares to be bought for capital injections (Japan Times 1998f). The FRC was 
an independent commission under the Prime Minister’s office. It had five members, 
including a cabinet member who served as the chairman, and oversaw the Financial 
Supervisory Agency. Through legislation, the Diet gave the FRC planning authority on 
matters concerning the resolution of financial institution failures and financial crisis 
management, as well as the authority to inspect and supervise financial institutions 
(Nakaso 1999).  
By legislation, the FRC’s term only lasted for two years and officially ended in January 2001 
(Spindle and Dvorak 2000). At that time, the FRC and the Financial Supervisory Agency 
were merged to create the Financial Services Agency (FSA), now Japan’s bank, insurance, 
and securities regulator. The FSA then took on the responsibilities of the FRC, and screened 
applications for the final three banks to apply for public injection through the Prompt 
Recapitalization Act.  
The Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) was created as a merger between the 
Housing Loan Administration Corporation and the Resolution and Collection Bank on April 
1, 1999, under the Financial Revitalization Act (RCC 2018; DICJ 2021b). The RCC was 
funded entirely by the DICJ (RCC 2018).  
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The RCC was a subsidiary of the DICJ (DICJ 2021b). The DICJ acts independently of the Bank 
of Japan or the Treasury, though in close cooperation. Financial assistance from the DICJ is 
funded through the issuance of government-backed DICJ bonds. In rare instances, the DICJ 
may borrow money directly from the Bank of Japan (FSB 2016). 
The RCC used DICJ capital to purchase preferred shares and subordinated debt of banks 
that requested capital injections (DICJ 2005) . The RCC noted that it was able to exercise its 
rights as a shareholder and investor, although available information doesn’t clarify to what 
extent the RCC exercised those rights (RCC 2018). The preferred shares converted to 
common shares after a grace period; if the FRC (or FSA after the merger of the two 
organizations) was dissatisfied by progress in restructuring for a specific bank, it could 
convert the shares to common shares and use its position as largest shareholder to put 
pressure on management (Kanaya and Woo 2000). The FRC determined the terms of the 
capital on a case-by-case basis (Nakaso 2001).  
Enforcement in defining the underwriting terms of the preferred shares and subordinated 
loans faced issues due to varying leadership styles over the year and a half of the execution 
of the law. While the first chair of the FRC, Hakuo Yanagisawa, attempted to enforce strict 
terms such as calling for major restructuring of banks in exchange for capital injections, he 
was removed from the position in less than a year to be followed by “less-resolute” 
chairmen due to attempts to balance coalitions built in the Diet by Prime Minister Obuchi. 
The changes in leadership to the FRC caused volatility in the Japanese market, with 
shareholders unsure of future underwriting terms. Under the new chair, Michio Ochi, the 
restructuring slowed. Where Yanagisawa inserted requirements that banks meet Basel 
capital standards, Ochi dropped such requirements; similarly, where Yanagisawa requested 
banks merge, Ochi was reluctant to force mergers (Spindle and Dvorak 2000). Following a 
scandal after recordings surfaced with Ochi inviting bankers to approach him for more 
lenient standards, Ochi was followed by three other Chairmen over the one and a half years 
of the FRC’s existence before the first chairman of the FRC, Hakuo Yanagisawa, was 
reappointed. 
4. The recapitalization bill and requirements for recapitalization were announced 
publicly and debated thoroughly before the execution of the capital injection. 
The bill, announced as part of a series of bills to address the jusen problem, was originally 
introduced as an idea by the Liberal Democratic Party in the plenary session of the 
Japanese Diet (Japan Times 1998a). After the passage of other financial revitalization bills, 
the Prompt Recapitalization Act faced much negotiation before its passage 14 days later 
(Japan Times 1998c). Components of the original proposal changed—for instance, the 
initial proposal contained a constraint that banks with a capital adequacy ratio of 8% or 
higher would only receive capital injections when there is an “imminent danger or 
deflationary spiral” (Japan Times 1998a).  
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5. There were no constraints on financial institutions for eligibility, though 
domestic banks were subject to a lower capital adequacy ratio requirement. 
Any domestic or foreign bank was eligible for a capital injection (Prompt Recapitalization 
Act 1998). However, no foreign banks participated (DICJ 2020b).  
The law did not require participation of any banks (Prompt Recapitalization Act 1998). The 
law also permitted applications by three specific non-banks, all cooperatives: Norinchukin 
Bank, Agricultural Cooperative Association, and the Federation of Fisheries Cooperative 
Associations. 
Banks considered “capitalized” were required to acquire or merge with a struggling bank in 
order to receive capital injections (Japan Times 1998d). The definition of under-
capitalization varied depending on whether the bank was a domestic or foreign entity, as 
shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4 below (Prompt Recapitalization Act 1998).  
Figure 4. Capital Ratios for financial institutions, bank holding companies, and their 
subsidiaries 
Source: Prompt Recapitalization Act 1998.  
6. The underwriting terms of capital injections were dependent on both 
capitalization status and management improvement plans. 
In addition to balance sheet information, banks were required to submit management 
improvement plans that explained structural changes they planned to make. These affected 
 Banks or credit unions 
with overseas sales offices, 
and Norinchukin Bank 
Other financial 
Institutions 
Classification of sound 
capital status 
Capital adequacy ratio of 8% Capital adequacy ratio of 4% 




Capital adequacy ratio of 4% 
to 8% 
Capital adequacy ratio based 
on domestic standards of 
2%-4% 
Classification indicating 
that there is a significant 
under-capitalized 
situation 
Capital adequacy ratio of 2% 
to 4% 
Capital adequacy ratio of 
1%- 2% 
Classification indicating 
that there is particularly 
low capital 
Capital adequacy ratio 
related to international 
unified standards 0% to 2% 
Capital adequacy ratio of 
0%- 1% 
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the underwriting terms for the preferred shares and subordinated bonds purchased in the 
capital injections. The FRC sought to encourage restructuring, cost reduction, and 
corporate reorganization, and including these factors in management improvement plans 
decreased the overall cost of government capital through reduced dividends and bond 
yields (Nakaso 2001). Capital was injected both through purchases of preferred shares and 
subordinated debt (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). (A detailed table listing of the dividend 
terms for preferred shares for the first 15 banks to receive injections is available in the 
source note; a listing of underwriting terms for subordinated debt of the first 15 banks to 
receive injections is available in the source note as well.) 
Preferred shares had mandatory conversion dates to common shares; however, many 
banks chose to purchase these preferred shares and reissue common shares before their 
respective mandatory conversion dates (DICJ 2020b).  
In addition, banks were encouraged to close foreign branches and subsidiaries, and 
incorporated such stipulations into their restructuring plans. They were rewarded in 
underwriting requirements guided by a rubric shown below in Figure 8. The proposed 
restructuring plans also involved reductions of personnel (Fukao 2000). An example of 
these proposed reductions are in Figures 5, 6, and 7 below: 
Figure 5. Proposed closing of foreign branches 
Bank Type 
Bank of Yokohama Complete withdrawal by March 1999 
Daiwa Bank Complete withdrawal by March 2000 
Mitsui Trust and Banking Complete withdrawal by March 2000 
Chuo Trust and Banking Complete withdrawal by March 2000 
Toyo Trust and Banking Complete withdrawal by March 2001 
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City banks:     
Industrial Bank of Japan 38 28 -10 -26 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo 46 31 -15 -33 
Sakura Bank 46 32 -14 -30 
Fuji Bank 43 27 -16 -37 
Sumitomo Bank 64 36 -28 -44 
Sanwa Bank 45 33 -12 -27 
Tokai Bank 46 21 -25 -54 
Asahi Bank 21 6 -15 -71 
Mitsubishi Trust and Banking 19 10 -9 -47 
Sumitomo Trust and Banking 16 6 -10 -66 
Source: Fukao 2000. 
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Figure 7: Proposed changes in personnel and related expenditures 
        **millions of yen, % 



















Industrial Bank of 
Japan 
4776 4482 -6 68600 68000 -1 60700 49800 -18 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo 
Bank 
16130 13200 -18 165600 138300 -17 166200 149300 -10 
Sakura Bank 
16700 13200 -21 179900 152100 -16 195300 185700 -5 
Fuji Bank 
14250 13000 -9 153000 137500 -10 137000 132500 -3 
Sumitomo Bank 
15000 13000 -13 156100 147300 -6 137800 128900 -7 
Daiwa Bank 
7640 6300 -18 63000 52300 -17 91778 89569 -2 
Sanwa Bank 
13600 11400 -16 148400 125600 -15 144400 140900 -2 
Tokai Bank 
11125 9731 -13 111600 92700 -17 89705 82996 -8 
Asahi Bank 
12800 11800 -8 113700 107000 -6 94000 93000 -1 
Bank of 
Yokohama 
5718 4512 -21 50500 43000 -15 41700 40000 -4 
Mitsubishi Trust 
and Banking 
4932 4695 -5 68293 62640 -8 60086 59828 0 
Sumitomo Trust 
and Banking 
5900 5200 -12 61000 52000 -15 56500 53600 -5 
Toyo Trust and 
Banking 
4100 3400 -17 42300 38100 -10 30700 30000 -2 
Mitsui Trust and 
Banking + Chuo 
Trust and Banking 
9980 8900 -11 91600 82100 -10 78300 71600 -9 
Total 
142651 122820 -14 1473593 
129864
0 -12 1384169 1307693 -6 
Source: Fukao 2000. 
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The management improvement plans were graded on a rubric, where points were allocated 
for restructuring behaviors consistent with the FRC’s expectations to successfully eliminate 
the non-performing loan problem. An approximate translation of the rubric is in Figure 9 
below: 
Figure 8: Rubric for management improvement plans 
Evaluation items for improvement of management soundness plan 
Gain Points 
1. Response to reorganization 
  
(1) Are you prepared for financial restructuring such as mergers, subsidiaries, and 
capital alliances? 
  (2) Are alliances with other types of businesses conducted? 
2. Business reconstruction 
  
(1) Has the regional bank completely withdrawn overseas or has it reduced overseas 
branches/local subsidiaries? 
  (2) Are there specific and clear strategies for improving profitability? 
  (3) Is the organization planning to fundamentally reform itself? 
3. Restructuring 
  (1) Has the total labor cost been reduced? 
  (2) Has the number of officers and the number of employees been reduced ? 
  (3) Have property costs (excluding mechanization costs) been reduced? 
4. Other 
  (1) Is the total amount of loans (excludes impact loans and actual basis) increased? 
  (2) Is self-procurement planned? 
  (3) Is the public fund application amount particularly sufficient? 
  (4) Is the internal corporate rating accurate? 
  (5) Is the liquidation of non-performing loans specifically planned? 
  (6) Is the usage of consultants and advisors abolished? 
271
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
 
  
(7) Has the average monthly salary decreased sufficiently (whether salary system has 
been revised)? 
  (8) Are dividends reduced? 
Lose Points 
  (1) Is processing of unrealized loss on securities slow? 
  (2) Is there a description of the background of the occurrence of bad debts? 
  (3) Is the number of officers changing or increasing? 
  
(4) Is the payment of director bonuses, remuneration, and retirement bonuses 
excessive? 
  (5) Is there an increase in property expenses? 
  (6) Is the disposal of idle facilities insufficient? 
Source: Financial Reconstruction Commission 2001. 
7. There were constraints on management pay as well as shareholder 
compensation. 
During the course of the capital injection, management positions were no longer allowed to 
take bonuses on their salary. In addition, the banks were no longer allowed to issue 
dividends to shareholders while using capital injection funding (Prompt Recapitalization 
Act 1998).  
8. There was no explicit exit strategy outlined or mandated for banks participating 
in the capital injection. 
All banks receiving capital injections in the form of subordinated debt received step-up 
clauses that began after three years of receiving the injection. Mandatory conversion dates 
of preferred shares for each bank varied widely, from within three months of injection in 
the case of Daiwa Bank to after six years in the case of Sumitomo Bank (DICJ 2020b).  
There were no explicit legislated or enforced exit strategies. However, all banks but one—
Shinsei Bank, formerly the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan—repurchased their shares by 
June 2015 (DICJ 2020b). The Shinsei Bank continues to list the Resolution and Collection 
Commission as a majority shareholder. As of March 31, 2020, the DICJ and RCC hold 18.1% 
of Shinsei bank’s common shares (Shinsei Bank 2021). These shares resulted from a 
negotiation between Ripplewood Holdings and the Japanese government, as a condition to 
buy the Long-Term Credit Bank in 1999. While Ripplewood could not immediately offload 
the bad loans, they were provided an injection through the capital injection scheme, in 
addition to a guarantee that the Japanese government double the Long-Term Credit Bank’s 
loan-loss reserves (Bremner 1999).  
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III. Evaluation 
Unlike the capital injection in March 1998, the Prompt Recapitalization Act provided more 
capital to relieve stress due to non-performing loans. However, there is some disagreement 
whether the capital injection was large enough to meet estimated potential losses in the 
Japanese banking system. Nakaso argues that the banking system suffered from nearly 
¥11.7 trillion potential losses due to non-performing loans in 1999. With the original ¥7.2 
trillion of injected capital, in addition to the ¥2.1 trillion of private fundraising and the ¥2.5 
trillion net operating profit, the capital injection was sufficient in capitalizing the banking 
sector (Nakaso 2001). However, some economists and analysts believed that 
underreporting of non-performing loans still occurred into 2002, after the capital injection. 
By 2002, the amount of non-performing loans in the banking system actually increased 
from the original ¥29.6 trillion in March 1999 to ¥42.0 trillion (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). 
Kashyap estimates that the combined effect of the banking problems was approximately 
¥40 trillion, though estimated varied broadly as seen below in Figure 10 (Kashyap 2002). 
Figure 9: Experts’ estimates of the insolvency of the Japanese banking system 
 
Source: Kashyap 2002.  




(October 31, 2001) 
¥70 trillion of net loan 
losses based on March 
2001 loans (¥18.7 trillion 
for the major banks) 
Large bank losses represented 
161% of capital adjusted for tax 






¥22 trillion Intended to be a lower bound for 
additional taxpayer exposure. 
James Fiorillo ING Securities (Japan) 
(August 2002) 
¥19.9 trillion in net loan 
losses, -¥2 trillion in 
unrealized capital gains 
Capital (as reported without 
adjustments) ¥16.2 trillion. 
Yukiko Ohara Credit Suisse First 
Boston Securities 
(Japan) Limited (July 
2002) 
¥21.8 trillion in required 
credit costs for the major 
banks 
Estimated non-performing loans 
for the major banks: ¥121.9 
trillion. 
Paul Sheard Lehman Brothers 
(August 2002) 
“To restore the balance 
sheet health and 
credibility of the banking 
system would probably 
require ¥30 to ¥50 
trillion.” 
Note that the deposit insurance 
fund has ¥49 trillion of untapped 
capacity. Thus, infrastructure and 
budgeting are in place to act if 
there was political will. 
Reiko Toritani Fitch Ratings (August 
2002) 
¥23 trillion for the major 
banks 
Adjusting the stated value of equity 
for the major banks as of March 
2002 to account for fictitious tax 
credits, public funds, and 
unrealized gains implies a market 
value of essentially zero. 
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Despite dispute over the appropriate size of the injections, it is widely believed that the 
injection helped recapitalize the Japanese financial system. Nakashima and Souma (2011) 
find the two injections of 1998 and 1999 significantly reduced financial risks faced by 
banks through reduced default risks. The capital injection of 1999 succeeded in comparison 
to the injections of 1998 due to the risk-based liability evaluations for capital injections in 
the Prompt Recapitalization Act, where regulators had access to bank balance sheets, in 
comparison to the Financial Function Stabilization Act, where the commission overseeing 
injections were unable to look at bank balance sheets (Nakaso 2001; Allen, Chakraborty, 
and Watanabe 2009). Banks receiving capital injections in 1999 increased lending, while 
the 1998 capital injection had no such effects (Allen, Chakraborty, and Watanabe 2009).  
In addition to the capital injections, banks merger activity accelerated. In January 1999, 
Chuo Trust & Banking Co. and Mitsui Trust & Banking Co. merged, cutting costs through 
lowering salaries in a new, unified pay scale. In the next year, 17 banks announced mergers 
(Spindle and Dvorak 2000).  
However, some constraints in the Japanese financial system interfered with the Japanese 
government’s ability to fully recapitalize the financial sector while successfully combating 
the full scale of the non-performing loan problem, leading to disputes over the true capital 
needs of the financial system.  
First, the implementation of adjusted Basel capital standards for banks lead to systemic 
overstating of capitalization on bank balance sheets due to Japanese accounting practices. 
Japanese banks engage in long-term relationships with the businesses they fund; as banks 
acquired shares in these firms, unrealized gains due to increase in share prices were 
“hidden” from bank balance sheets by Japanese accounting standards. During negotiations 
determining capital standards with the Basel committee, Japanese regulators successfully 
argued that unrealized gains from these keiretsu shares should be counted towards tier-II 
capital standards. However, as share prices fell, actual rates of capitalization fell as well, 
reducing the size of Japanese banks’ tier-II capital holdings (Ito and Sasaki 2002). In 
addition, Japanese banks tend to reserve only against recognized bad loans. In the early 
2000s, the banks only capitalized enough to cover between 40 to 60 percent of all bad 
loans in the banking system (Hoshi and Kashyap 2004).  
Additionally, the fear of falling below capital standards encouraged bank credit lending to 
insolvent borrowers under the belief that non-performing loans would become performing 
loans, or the government would bail them out (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap 2008). While 
banks may lend capital to temporarily insolvent firms, Japanese banks continued extending 
credit to firms unlikely to repay the loans. The practice of keeping insolvent firms alive—
even when receipt of repayment is doubtful—is referred to as evergreening. Evergreening 
was especially prevalent in the Japanese financial system. Bank loans actually increased in 
underperforming sectors (Hoshi and Kashyap 2004).  
Firms with lower rates of profit and poor rates of return in the market received more loans 
on the whole. Evergreening continued despite the lack of profitability due to the 
overvaluation of keiretsu loans; had these firms gone bankrupt, the overvaluation of capital 
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on bank balance sheets would be revealed (Hoshi and Kashyap 2004). Whenever 
borrowers faced serious financial trouble, banks would extend loans to conceal the status 
of borrowers’ underperforming loans (Fukuda and Nakamura 2011).  
The Japanese government also contributed to this process. After 1998, the government 
heavily encouraged banks to increase their lending to small and medium-sized firms, 
providing subsidized credit to these firms. Evergreening kept firms alive which distorted 
competition through subsidized credit to underperforming firms. By the early 2000s, 
roughly 30% of publicly traded firms were on “life support,” though weighted by assets, 
these firms only constituted 15% of all publicly traded firms (Caballero, Hoshi, and 
Kashyap 2008). These firms—referred to as zombie firms—exhibited inefficient behavior, 
impacting productivity performance in Japan as inefficient firms reduced sector growth 
(Ahearne and Shinada 2005). These zombie firms created ongoing distortions in the 
market with lower job creation and industry productivity (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap 
2008). 
Simultaneously, in an attempt to raise capital from the private sector, banks would raise 
money from life insurance companies, in a style of cyclical asset purchasing to build capital 
known as double gearing. Banks issued securities to be purchased by life insurance 
corporations. In return, life insurance companies issued subordinated debt and notes 
purchased by banks which counted towards capitalization ratios for banks while 
simultaneously increasing the capital with which life insurers could purchase bank 
issuances. With this transaction, banks and insurers appeared more capitalized on their 
balance sheets than the real amount of capitalization (Hoshi and Kashyap 2004). At the end 
of March 2001, seven life insurers held ¥5.4 trillion of bank stocks, and ¥5.1 trillion of bank 
subordinated debts. In exchange, banks held ¥1 trillion of insurers’ surplus notes and ¥1.7 
of subordinated debt (Fukao 2003). 
These transactions introduced systemic risk to the Japanese banking sector, with insurance 
companies constituting at least two of many banks’ top five shareholders as of 2002 (BIS 
2002). Any failures of these insurers will lead to direct losses by banks (Hoshi and Kashyap 
2004). When Chiyoda Life failed in October of 2000, Tokai Bank lost ¥74 billion yen—more 
than 10% of the size of Tokai Bank’s capital injection in March 1999 (Fukao 2003; DICJ 
2020b). 
While Japanese regulators prohibit this transaction between pairs of banks or pairs of 
insurers, they allow the behavior between bank-insurer combinations (Hoshi and Kashyap 
2004). However, during the early 2000s, this practice was actually encouraged by certain 
regulators, with the head of the Financial Services Agency publicly stating that double 
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